Humanitarian mediation – which is the conduct of conflict-related mediation with a humanitarian agenda and purpose – is “often an easier and more productive entry point than conflict resolution in a volatile and unresolved situation, where there may be little common political ground,” Mr McNamara explains.  Moreover, he notes that despite the overall lack of institutional engagement with non-state actors in conflict areas to date, the activities of the HD Centre’s Humanitarian Mediation Programme have shown that rebel groups generally “welcome the chance to talk”.

“Going to… the field, eating roast goat in a wadi under the trees on the Chad border in the middle of a desert with armed [combatants] in full battle dress helps to build up trust, confidence and credibility.”

Mr McNamara reflects on the role of humanitarian mediation in the context of broader conflict resolution processes and shares firsthand lessons from his own experiences speaking to rebel groups. He points to concrete achievements of the humanitarian mediation programme in altering combatant behaviour and considers how this ‘niche’ activity could be expanded in the future to address widespread civilian suffering and humanitarian challenges in a range of ongoing conflicts.

The podcast is available for download on the HD Centre website. Further information on the Humanitarian Mediation Programme can be found at http://www.hdcentre.org/projects/humanitarian-mediation.

The Arab revolutions are beginning to destroy the cliché of an Arab world incapable of democratic transformation. But another caricature is replacing it: according to the new narrative, the crowds in Cairo, Benghazi or Damascus, mobilized by Facebook and Twitter, are the latest illustration of the spread of Western democratic ideals; and while the “rise of the rest” may challenge the economic dominance of Western nations, the West will continue to define the political agenda of the world.

In that optimistic scenario, 1989 and 2011 are two chapters of the same story, which connect in a self-congratulatory way the political appeal of democracy and the transformative power of entrepreneurship and new technologies.

In reality, the movements that are shaking the Arab world are profoundly different from the revolutions that ended the Soviet empire. The Arab spring is about justice and equity as much as it is about democracy, because societies in which millions of young men and women have no jobs — and millions live with less than two dollars a day — crave justice as much as democracy.

As I heard one experienced Arab diplomat say, today’s revolutions are against “profiteers” as much as they are against dictators. The movements are also profoundly suspicious of foreign interference, and Western nations, which for many years have had a cozy relationship with dictators and profiteers, will be utilized, but they are unlikely to be trusted or to serve as models as they were in 1989.

The implications for our Middle Eastern policies are wide-ranging. The good news is that the focus on social justice and practical issues of development and redistribution has the potential to move the public debate further away from dreams of a return to the mythical past of the caliphate promoted by radical Islamists.

In the words of the French scholar Olivier Roy, the Arab revolutions may well become the first “post-Islamist” revolutions. But that will happen only if we in the West accept that Muslim values — which have, like Christian or Jewish values, many interpretations — can become part of the political debate, without being at the center of it.

The more we try to polarize secular forces against Islamic movements, the more unlikely it is that secular values will win. We must abandon the illusion that the defining issue in the region is a battle between moderates and hardliners. Europe and the United States could send a strong signal by ending their policy of “à la carte democracy” and start talking to movements such as Hamas or Hezbollah — which does not mean that we in any way agree with their views.

Bringing the Muslim Brotherhood and related organizations into mainstream politics rather than trying to isolate them should be a priority. This is all the more necessary as the aspiration to justice will lead to demands that the present élites — and in particular security establishments — relinquish their grip not only on power, but also on the economy, and that demand may eventually trigger a second wave of upheavals.

A more democratic Arab world is also likely to be less tolerant of the benign neglect with which the international community has often addressed the Israel-Palestine and the Israeli-Arab conflicts since 2000. That should not be seen as a threat by countries that support a resolution of the conflict in accordance with international law and a two-states solution, but it will require a “reset” of the policies of the last 10 years.

Lastly, as we discover that 2011 is not 1989, and that we are no more the trusted reference, we will have to navigate in unchartered waters: our engagement in Libya will probably have less moral clarity at the end than it has had at the start. Political processes will inevitably be messy, and we will be tempted, especially in oil-rich nations, to pick winners and manipulate outcomes.

That would be disastrous for our long-term standing: in a region whose future has repeatedly been decided by foreigners since the end of the Ottoman empire, outside powers will have to demonstrate that this time they are genuinely willing to support home-grown political processes.

The West has to accept that it is not the central player anymore. But it need not be an indifferent and passive spectator. Finding the balance between engagement and restraint will be the policy challenge of this new phase.

In Libya and possibly in some other situations, the active involvement of the United Nations to find a political solution may help us find that new balance by providing the impartiality and sufficient distance from great powers politics without which no political process will have a sustainable outcome.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno, a former United Nations under-secretary general for peacekeeping operations, is Chairman of the Board of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, professor of professional practice at the Saltzman Institute of Columbia University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

First Published New York Times , 21 April 2011

Following the royal takeover and subsequent public protests, women also participated actively in organising the so-called “people’s movement II”. After the peace accord in 2006 and the promulgation of the interim constitution, the Maoists gave 30 percent of seats in the Interim Parliament to women. Democracy, republicanism, secularism, federalism, and inclusion all became core values for the people’s movement and peace negotiation process.

This generated lots of hope and expectation among women for equality in Nepal, as women are still in grossly imbalanced power relations at home and at work. They are also excluded from access to, and control over, resources. The law itself discriminates against them and as a result denies equal access to equal rights in inheritance and conferring citizenship to their offspring through the mother. A few improvements in the legal status of women in Nepal – most notably, in inheritance law and in redressing some forms of violence against women – have taken place including the Supreme Court intervention in public interest litigation and through the legal amendments in the Gender Equality Amendment Acts in 2002 and 2006, and with the adoption of Anti Human Trafficking Act 2007 and Domestic Violence Control Act 2009.

But when the formal negotiations for a peace process were started, and when a comprehensive peace agreement was signed in 2006, not a single woman was included. The Interim Constitution drafting committee and the Judicial Inquiry Commission were formed without any women. Ultimately, after pressure from women’s groups, four women were included representing the political parties. The Interim Parliament resolution adopted a 33 per cent reservation for women in parliament. The Interim constitution guaranteed proportional representation and further guaranteed 33 per cent candidacy for women to the constituent assembly elections. But it wasn’t until the proportional election system reserved 50 per cent candidacy for women that the elections ultimately did result in 33 per cent of women members in the Constituent Assembly.

However, except for a similar percentage of representation in so-called Local Peace Committees, other institutions and agencies of the Nepali state are yet to robustly include women – including in political parties, the judiciary (2 per cent), and the security sector (3  per cent in the army and 7 per cent in the police). Except for the National Women’s Commission, not a single public or constitutional body is formally headed by a woman.

There must also be the recognition that the development of women’s capabilities and their advancement was hindered historically, as well as during and after the decade-long conflict. Historical apathy towards women was only amplified during war. Subsequently, their different needs and experiences during conflict and during transition have been completely ignored in the peacemaking process. In addition to being raped, sexually exploited, widowed and orphaned, women had to take on the burdens of family and livelihoods or migrate (compelled to take any kind of job for survival). The UN’s first verification process indicated 20-25 per cent of Maoist combatants were women, whereas the second verification round showed only 10.5 per cent women in cantonment sites. However no detailed assessment of women combatants needs has ever been undertaken. Ensuring access to justice for rape victims during the insurgency and women’s exploitation and discrimination in the Maoist cantonment sites have never been seen as political issues. The much-vaunted peace agreement failed to acknowledge the different impact of conflict on women and failed to assure the implementation of specific measures to address it. When the Special Committee for Reintegration of Maoist Combatants was formed, it too failed to include a single woman in either the technical committee or the secretariat, though there are many women commanders in the Maoist forces. The fact that women are seen as good enough to command and die on the battlefield but not good enough to lead in public life has sullied the image of the pro-women Maoists as well as the other political parties.

Similarly, although women’s representation in the Constituent Assembly is claimed as an historic achievement, women remain excluded from decision-making processes due to the formation of male-occupied high-level political committees in and across parties. While these high-level mechanisms may not be aimed at excluding women, they certainly do not intentionally include women either and therefore represent another lost opportunity to demonstrate commitment to gender equality. In addition to numerical participation, these male-dominated political party mechanisms have deep deleterious effects on the substantive contributions of women to the constitution-making process. As a result, decisions are made for women by men whose values and standards continue to reinforce patriarchy. For example, we are in a constitution-drafting process and parties are reaching a consensus on some of the contentious issues through political dialogue. A political agreement reached in November 2010 to improve the citizenship provisions in the upcoming constitution discriminates against women in the case of conferring citizenship to their children and to their spouse and, as a result, the number of stateless children will be increased and women’s independent existence will not be recognised. This political agreement on citizenship is even more regressive for women than the past two constitutions as it does not recognise the individual identity of men or women independently.

The present political crisis surrounding power-sharing and the differences among leaders within almost every party has overshadowed the peace process. It has hindered the formation of transitional justice mechanisms such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Disappearances Commission, denying victims the right to justice. A Plan of Action on UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security has recently been   adopted.

A five-member subcommittee with one woman member headed by Prachand (head of the Maoist Party and ex Prime Minister) has been formed to resolve the remaining disputes associated with the upcoming constitution. Some level of hope had been generated with the progress the subcommittee was making, but at present the subcommittee has also not been able to work effectively. The major dispute among the leaders at present is whether to complete Maoist ex-combatant re-integration first or tackle constitutional change first. All of this paralysis in high politics has created hopelessness among people and, worse, a feeling of disengagement from the collaborative state-building exercise they all embarked on after the elections in 2008. Party leaders have to seriously evaluate why they exist and for whom they work, remembering the vision they have outlined for the country under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Trust, once lost, is very difficult to rebuild.

____________________________________

Sapana Pradhan Malla is a lawyer and women’s right activist who has contributed extensively to women’s rights both within Nepal and internationally. She is the Founding President of one of the country’s leading women’s rights organisation, the Forum for Women, Law and Development, and engaged in amending discriminatory law through advocacy, research and drafting different laws including the Gender Equality Amendment Act, a model Human Trafficking Act, and a domestic violence law. She has extensively researched discrimination against women and filed several public interest litigations to reform discriminatory laws and uphold gender equality. She has been extensively engaged in raising the awareness of government institutions and courts of gender issues and she has strengthened civil society through capacity-building exercises conducted throughout Nepal and the region. She has been awarded the Gruber International Women’s Rights Award. Most recently, Sapana was elected to the Constituent Assembly where she has been working on committees responsible for drafting the Constitution and legislation.

The Armed Forces Special Powers Bill was passed by both the Houses of Parliament and it received the assent of the President on 11th September, 1958. It came onto the Statute Book as “The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958”. The AFSPA is based on a 1942 British ordinance intended to contain the Indian independence movement (Quit India movement) during World War II. Enacted as a short-term measure to allow the deployment of the army in India’s northeastern Naga Hills, the AFSPA has been in existence for five decades. It has since been used throughout the northeast and particularly in Assam, Nagaland, Tripura and Manipur. Indian officials have long argued for the continued use of the law by citing the need for the armed forces to have extraordinary powers to combat armed insurgents. 

Under the Indian Constitution, the AFSPA violates the following articles: (a) Article 21 – The right to life – is violated by section 4(a) of the AFSPA, which grants the armed forces the power to shoot to kill in law enforcement situations without regard to the restrictions of international human rights law on the use of lethal force ; (b) Article 14 – The right to equality – This article guarantees that “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”; (c) Article 22- Protection against arrest and detention. Article 22 of the Indian Constitution provides protection against arrest and detention and under section 5 of the AFSPA, a person arrested must be handed over to the nearest police station with the least possible delay along with the circumstances occasioning such arrest but this has not been followed at all.

We, the women of Manipur as well as other parts of northeast India, have long protested against the AFSPA. We have held meetings, rallies, carried out campaigns and marched to India’s Houses of Parliament to bring the issue to light. Since the year 2000, Irom Sharmila, from Manipur, has been on hunger strike demanding repeal of the act. The government has responded by keeping her in judicial custody in a hospital in Manipur, force-fed through a nasal tube.

The AFSPA has violated women’s rights for a long time. Many cases of wrongful arrest, torture and rape have occurred since AFSPA was imposed. You can speak to any women in northeast India and they will tell you tales of how the AFSPA has violated their rights, taken their futures away. Who can forget the brutal extra judicial execution of Manorama Devi in Manipur in 2004? After being arrested by members of the Assam Rifles in July 2004, Devi was found dead near her house in the Ngariyan area the next morning.  She was shot through the lower half of her body in an attempt to hide that bullet wounds had been used in an attempt to hide evidence of rape. The Assam Rifles claimed that Devi was a member of an armed group. However at the time of her arrest, no weapons were found and many say that, even if she was involved with a group, that is no way to arrest and kill a person.

Manipur women rose in anger against the rape and killing of Manorama Devi. An extraordinary protest took place where women stripped in front of Kangla, which is an important historical and archeological site of Manipur and which was used as headquarters of the Assam Rifles (which is a paramilitary force), an episode which shook India and the world. In response, the Prime Minister came and assured the women of Manipur that he would take action. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh eventually responded by setting up the Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy Committee to review the AFSPA. The committee recommended repeal of the Act in its report submitted on June 6, 2005. Due to opposition from the armed forces, the government has sat on the report and refused to appeal the Act. Till now in 2010, no one has been punished for that killing. We all hold the AFSPA responsible because those who killed Manorama Devi knew that they would not be touched because of the AFSPA.

There has long been international criticism of the AFSPA. In 1997, the United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed concern over the “climate of impunity” provided by the Act. Since then, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (2006), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2007) and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2007) have all called for an end to the AFSPA. But nothing has happened.

Women from the northeast believe that we can play a pivotal role in bringing about peace and justice in the region with collective voices from all sections of the society if we sincerely work together. That is why, in June 2009, we formed the North East Women Initiative for Peace (NEWIFP). Many know how women’s groups in northeast India have developed many powerful programmes of direct, non-violent, action designed to confront the armed violence of both the insurgents and the security forces. However, most of their actions remain in “protest” form and, after the initial action dies down, nothing much happens. The women’s movement in India’s northeast that has emerged in response to the ongoing armed conflict is still confined to “saving the sons of the soil” syndrome. The women of northeast India need to make ourselves understand the issues of war, conflict and peace. We need to understand the different aspects of violence and the militarization of northeast societies so that we can contribute to a solution.

As a part of this initiative, we have to directly engage in debates and dialogue with the armed forces and government officials on the highly controversial and sensitive topic of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. We will need to continue this journey until we bring about the change that we wish to see.

___________________________

Binalakshmi Nepram is a writer-civil rights activist who has published in both national and international journals on issues relating to armed violence, small arms proliferation, peace processes, women and peace building. She is the author of three books, “South Asia’s Fractured Frontier: Armed Conflict, Narcotics and Small Arms Proliferation in India’s Northeast”, “Meckley”, a historical fiction based on the conflict in Manipur and an edited book titled “India and the Arms Trade Treaty” published in 2009. In 2004, Ms Nepram co-founded the Control Arms Foundation of India. In 2007, in order to help thousands of women who are affected by gun violence in her home-state of Manipur, she launched the Manipuri Women Gun Survivor’s Network. In 2010 she was awarded the Sean MacBride Peace Prize by the International Peace Bureau.

However, since then, little has moved on either of these fronts. Indonesia has not yet managed to deploy the observers – now set at 15 on each side of the border. More worryingly, Thai military officials have said they do not want to join bilateral talks on the border dispute in a third country. Cambodia, for its part insists on the talks taking place in Indonesia. The talks are set to start on April 7th in Bogor, a city outside Jakarta where ironically the first round of the Cambodian peace process meetings was convened in 1988.

Should the agreement unravel, there is the threat of renewed fighting along the border. This could then lead to further international diplomatic manoeuvring that could see the issue return to the floor of the UN Security Council in New York.

ASEAN stands to lose a lot of diplomatic face. The 22nd February agreement among ASEAN Foreign Ministers boosted the regional organisation’s conflict management credentials and lent impetus to further development of ASEAN’s mediation role. It would be a particular blow for Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, whose personal diplomatic intervention, involving visits to Thailand, Cambodia and the United Nations in New York, helped broker the deal that reduced tensions.

Indonesia is chairman of ASEAN for the year and is hoping that the reinforcement of ASEAN’s role in preserving regional security will be a crowning achievement for the year. The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, formally adopted at the 14th ASEAN Summit in 2009, calls for the strengthening of existing mechanisms for the settlement of disputes. It also urges the development of ASEAN modalities for good offices, conciliation and mediation.

So how can the situation be fixed? Thai officials are hoping to persuade their military colleagues that the bilateral meetings with Cambodia can be held in Indonesia. The diplomats can go ahead and meet under the auspices of the civilian-run Joint Border Committee, whilst the military is involved in a separate general Border Committee. They will insist that Indonesian officials stay out of the meetings and hope that Cambodia accepts this too.

Meanwhile, Indonesia’s defence attaches are in the process of visiting the border areas of both countries to prepare for the monitoring mission. Given the extreme sensitivities, it is hardly surprising that the process is taking some time. Privately, Thai officials say it is important for the Indonesian monitors to steer clear of the disputed zone in the immediate vicinity of the disputed Hindu temple.

But more importantly it is now time for other agencies such as UNESCO, which helped spark renewed tensions along the border after considering an application for listing the disputed temple as a world heritage site, to contribute to a de-escalation of the conflict. This might be possible. It has been suggested that UNESCO consider a multiple listing of other ancient sites that litter the long Thai-Cambodian border – thereby taking the heat off the disputed Preah Vihear temple.

It would of course also help a great deal if politicians on both sides of the border stopped stoking the border dispute. Nationalism is one of the crudest but also the most lethal of weapons, as it turns differences of opinion into war.

The writer, Michael Vatikiotis, is the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue’s Regional Director for Asia, based in  Singapore.

But even as the talks are hopefully in the final period, who is going to talk about gender?  Those who want to “insert” gender in the peace process always encounter the question:  what has gender got to do with it?

There is some hope that some of those involved in the negotiations may take a more enlightened view. On the one hand, across the government and MILF peace panels, there is only one woman. However the fact that the Philippine Cabinet Secretary responsible for the peace process, Teresita “Ging” Quintos Deles, and the lone woman in the Philippine panel, Miriam Coronel Ferrer, are well-known feminists makes one more optimistic that gender will be considered seriously on the agenda. The MILF has begun to address its poor track record of including women, recently announcing that they will name two women as advisers to their panel. There has not been a single woman on either the peace panel or the technical committee of the MILF since talks began in 1997.

Women’s groups have also been able to engage in the peace process to a greater degree through organising women’s summits and submitting their women’s peace agenda.

In 2008 the Philippine Supreme Court suspended an agreement on the issue of ancestral domain that had been reached between the government and MILF, claiming the lack of participation of other stakeholders rendered the deal unconstitutional. While the Court’s actions lead to a sharp rise in violence, it also underscored the importance of engaging groups outside the formal peace process.

Encouraged by the Philippines becoming the first country in Asia to draw up a National Action Plan to implement UN Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security, women’s groups seized this opportunity. A national network called “We ACT for 1325” is spearheading the implementation of the National Action Plan. In Mindanao, 30 organisations have formed an umbrella group, “Mindanao 1325”, as their vehicle for involvement in the implementation of the NAP.  A Mindanao Contact Group on Peace, led by women, is actively involved in track two activities.

So while there has been considerable difficulty in restarting talks, when they do eventually continue, at least there will be some individuals and groups both inside and outside the peace process that can answer the question “What has gender got to do with it?” When the talks continue, the panels will go over the ancestral domain issues including territory, natural resources, and governance yet again. Then they will take up the end-game issues, namely DDR and institutional mechanisms for implementation – all of which need to be analysed and discussed in their entirety, which means including a gender perspective. The Supreme Court decision directing wider public participation, the existence of women in key positions in the peace process at the top and on the ground, and the creation of mechanisms for greater involvement by women in track one and track two processes have created an unprecedented momentum for a gender agenda in the negotiations for peace in the Philippines.  
 

Irene M. Santiago is the founding Chair and Chief Executive Officer of the Mindanao Commission on Women and Convenor of the Mothers for Peace Movement in the Philippines. She has been a senior adviser to the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and was one of two women on the Philippine government panel negotiating peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front from 2001 to 2004. In 1995, she headed the secretariat of the NGO Forum on Women held in China, part of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, the biggest international gathering of women in history. She is also a member of the faculty of the Rotary Peace Center at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand. Santiago has helped found a number of organisations, including the Institute for Women’s Leadership, the Kahayag Training Institute on Gender, and WomenVote. In 2005, she was nominated as one of 1,000 women for the Nobel Peace Prize.

One of the key concerns is stability and security – whether in fact ASEAN will be burdened with a fragile state, prone to unrest and internal conflict.

Such concerns are probably misplaced. To be sure, East Timor has experienced birth pangs, most notably when members of the armed forces mounted a rebellion of sorts in 2007 that later led to the President’s near-fatal shooting in 2008.  But worries that the uprising, which was quelled through mediation and dialogue, would split the country turned out to be over-exaggerated.  If anything, the shooting incident, in which President Jose Ramos Horta almost lost his life, helped galvanize the country’s querulous political factions to unite and save the country from further division and deepening conflict. 

Set against the kind of unrest and political turbulence witnessed in other ASEAN country within this past decade, East Timor’s teething problems are not particularly unusual.  In fact, levels of violence have been relatively low in the past two years, and perhaps more importantly, all the parties involved in the countries internal conflicts have been open to mediation and dialogue. 

This is not to say there is complete confidence that East Timor ‘s security is assured.  The UN maintains a 1,440 strong security presence in the country, prompted by the gang violence that erupted in 2006. There are palpable fears of political unrest before elections due to be held in 2012.  Recently the UN Security Council called on East Timor to strengthen the “credibility” of its police force as it extended the UN mission’s mandate. 

The poverty issue is real.  East Timor has a wealth of natural resources but very little capacity to absorb the estimated USD 7.2 billion it has already earned from offshore natural gas fields.  More than 85% of the population of 1.2 million is rural and poverty rates exceed 40%.  The government is spending frantically on infrastructure, but it will take time before most Timorese can enjoy the benefits of better schools, electricity and port facilities.  Neither would these facilities be much use to foreign investors unless there is assured access to neighbouring Indonesian regions, which ASEAN membership will assure. 

In diplomatic terms, one of the most promising, and perhaps surprising aspects of East Timor’s independent history since 2002 has been its close relationship with Indonesia. Given the long period of struggle for independence against Indonesia led by the current generation of east Timor’s leaders, the situation could have been different.  Deep within Timorese society there is a legacy of bitterness and a desire for truth and justice, but real-politik prevails at the leadership level.  And with good reason – East Timor is surrounded by Indonesia and depends on its neighbour for efficient access to the outside world. 

Indonesia for its part has shown an unusual degree of warmth towards a territory that fought and won its independence a quarter of a century after the Indonesian invasion.  The two countries jointly organized a truth and reconciliation exercise, which though falling short on delivering justice, did address aspects of the truth and resulted in an apology from the Indonesian leadership for human rights abuses. 

Since then, the two countries have maintained a cordial relationship.  Most of the up and coming leaders in East Timor were educated in Indonesia, and Indonesian is still the lingua franca in common use in East Timor.  Indonesia is also providing support in terms of training and education for civil servants.

Not surprisingly, Indonesia is in the vanguard of support for East Timor’s becoming the eleventh member of ASEAN. “I know that some believe that it (Timor’s entry) may impact on ASEAN community building efforts. Indonesia is part of those who believe the case on the contrary,” Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa told the media.  Natalegawa said it was neither unique nor unusual to have a situation of development gaps between ASEAN members, citing economic differences between the original member states and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.

In regional security terms it makes a lot of sense to incorporate East Timor, which has attracted a good deal of international attention because of its rich mineral wealth.  China has courted the young nation assiduously, and built the presidential palace as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Recently China sold the East Timor navy two patrol boats. The European Union led by Timor’s former colonial ruler Portugal has signed a cooperation agreement, and is pushing for the remodeling of linguistic and institutional structures on Portuguese. 

The most likely scenario is that East Timor will be admitted as an observer to ASEAN this year, and membership will proceed over the next two to three years.  One reservation some have is that if East Timor is admitted, it strengthens the case for Papua New Guinea, which has long wanted to join ASEAN and already has observer status – but is seen by many in the region as not really situated in Southeast Asia.

The writer, Michael Vatikiotis, is the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue’s Regional Director for Asia, based in  Singapore.

Hence, a Track 1.5 process was initiated in 2005: the Nepal Transition To Peace Initiative (NTTP). The idea was to create space for informal dialogue where the seven major political parties and civil society representatives could discuss their differences before making formal decisions. It was considered to be relatively inclusive, and was supported by multiple stakeholders, including international partners. The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction acted as the executing agency liaising between the political parties.

The NTTP was understood, not as a settlement oriented negotiation process, but rather as a consultation that could generate new insights and be a source of technical knowledge and inspiration for the parties involved. It was a facilitation rather than a mediation oriented process.  Local facilitators received technical assistance from international peace building experts, which built ownership in the process.

The NTTP made a number of important contributions. It helped draft the CPA, propose how cantonment of combatants would be managed, and envisaged the setting up of peace structures such as Local Peace Committees (LPC).

It also supported the creation of the Women Peace Building Network which was made up of 11 large associations, mostly with a development background, with widespread membership in Nepal. This Network tried to create links between Tracks 1, 1.5 and 2, and to link leaders with peace forums. In addition to organising rallies to demand greater women’s participation in the peace process, they held several rounds of discussions with the Prime Minister and the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction to ensure women’s participation in state structures. They also approached the Election Commission on the selection of 26 women to be nominated to the Constituent Assembly (CA). At a community level, the Network sought to raise awareness of UN Security Council resolution 1325 (SCR 1325).

Essentially, the Network acted as a connector to the NTTP to ensure that women’s rights were articulated and heard, and that women were included in the peace process and transitional justice mechanisms. Behind the scenes, at least three women from the Network sat in the NTTP forum meetings and one was nominated to the Ministry-level meetings and Peace and Conflict Management Committee (PCMC) at a later stage.

As the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections approached, the Network became actively involved in educating people about voting systems, seeing that proportional representation would help ensure a larger number of women members in the CA. They also approached the Election Commission on the selection of women for 26 nominated seats in the parliament.

The Network’s successes are hard to measure in that its achievements cannot be attributed solely to its own work – for example, the Network played an important role in ensuring that a third of the seats in the CA would be reserved for women, but was by no means the only actor calling for this. The fact that the Network was made up of so many large associations certainly helped its voice on this issue to be heard.

But at the same time, the peace process was driven by male-dominated political parties and a bureaucracy that was not especially sensitive to the needs of women. Though large in number, the Network was not as assertive as some ethnic groups and so was often avoided by political leaders. While this constrained the impact of the Network in some ways, these challenges also forced the Network to develop organisational and advocacy skills which allows them to contribute to the peace process more meaningfully today.        

Sharada Jnawali works in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Nepal Residence Mission in the position of Peace Building Advisor. In this capacity, she advises the Mission on use of peace building tool for conflict sensitive programming and implementation for all the ADB’s engagements in Nepal. Under this initiative, she is responsible for sensitization of the ADB staff on importance of peace building perspective in development projects, ensure addressing of structural causes of conflict in program designs and implementation, and share best practices on the initiatives. Prior to this, She worked with USAID, planning and managing high level peace dialogues, projects related to women’s participation in peace process and donors coordination on peace building and represented the institution to SCR 1325 and 1820 action plans. She also managed the community reconciliation activities with women, youth and disadvantaged groups. Sharada holds a Masters in Economics and ten years of experience in planning and managing conflict resolution and peace building projects in Nepal.

This blog post is written in her personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Asian Development Bank.

 At a Think-Tank on police reform convened by the Minister of Interior in Kabul from 29 November to 1 December 2010, ISAF’s Major General Beare reported optimistically that his National Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) was progressing. One year after centralising training, police strength had increased 23 per cent from 94,958 to 116,367; 13,955 received mandatory literacy training, as most recruits are illiterate. With huge new training centres opened, NTM-A had overshot its schedule towards deploying 134,000 police by October 2011.[i] The previous week, at NATO’s Lisbon Summit member states committed to maintaining their military presence in Afghanistan until 2014, and continuing peacebuilding support thereafter.[ii]

Has NATO’s nine year commitment to security in Afghanistan and this recent surge in police deployment benefited ordinary Afghans, particularly women and children? Patently not. On 25 November 2010, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission called urgent attention to the alarming rise in sexual violence against women and children in Afghanistan.

This is shocking, but it mirrors a global phenomenon. Societies emerge from war proudly brandishing peace agreements, but their women and children face higher levels of violence – criminal, political, sexual and domestic – and steeper mortality rates than during war. ‘Post’-war societies, whether in Africa, Asia, Balkans, Latin America or Middle East, confirm this alarming trend.

What relevance does this have for peacemaking?

Sometimes prescient mediators delineate rule of law reform, and separate police from military functions after war’s militarisation within peace agreements, thus forcing compliance from recalcitrant government officials, as in El Salvador. Often, as in Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement, mediators achieve minimal terms in highly constrained negotiations, leaving national leaders and international peacebuilders to haggle over details later. This is short-sighted.

With spiraling insecurity in ostensible ‘post-war’ settings, police are invariably deployed to perform military functions, leaving civilians unprotected with impunity rampant. Untrained in their proper function of upholding rule of law and protecting civilians’ rights, police frequently – albeit unwittingly – violate law themselves in imposing order, losing public trust not only in the police but in the state itself.

This is Afghanistan’s reality. As Taliban insurgency spreads, despite the presence of US troops and an increasing number of largely US-trained Afghan National Army troops, ill-trained police recruited from desperately poor, unemployed and illiterate populations, are sent in to combat with disastrous consequences. Furthermore, both police and army are centrally trained by the NTM-A, potentially increasing police-military confusion.

Meanwhile civilian policing is minimal or absent, and spoilers violate and traffic women and children, alongside drugs, without consequences. Violence against women is considered a second-order priority, to be dealt with once security is established and insurgency defeated. Ironically, it is not recognised that often the same spoilers who violate women cause national insecurity, and acting firmly against them would reduce the security threat itself.

Establishing the Afghan National Police as a civilian police service that serves all Afghans and upholds the rule of law is a priority, as is regaining public trust by resuming police functions and desisting from military functions, despite the demands of counter-insurgency.[iii] Fortunately, the Ministry of Interior recognises this. Commendably, the Minister of Interior, Bismullah Mohammadi’s six priorities include increasing women’s recruitment from today’s roughly 1,000 to at least 5,000, and instituting rewards and punishments for police to establish internal accountability.[iv] But today, cultural, professional and security disincentives deter women although in the 1970s, women constituted one third of Afghanistan’s police, including as commanders.

All cultures and religions enshrine the values of justice, dignity and equality before divine law, and protect the most vulnerable, particularly women, children and elderly. Violating women and children is not only against international human rights law, but intolerable to cultural and spiritual sensitivities; it is abhorrent to Islamic and Afghan values, yet unchecked in Afghanistan today.

Several lessons can be drawn from Afghanistan for peacemaking:

• Peace agreements must prioritise the prevention of violence against women and children, and enforce zero-tolerance of violations.
• Mediators must dare to address impunity and establish clear accountability terms and mechanisms within peace agreements. Otherwise impunity will scupper peace.
• The tendency towards minimalist peace agreements must be re-assessed; wherever possible, justice and rule of law issues must be addressed in detail. Police reform, as distinct from security sector reform, must be spelt out. Leaving it to later can be counter-productive.
• Peace agreements addressing police reform must specify the requirement for a police service that upholds the rule of law at all times in protecting civilians, and desists from military functions. The police are the first face of the state; if people don’t trust their police, they will not trust their government, or the new peace.
• Mediators cannot ignore culture. Culture can be an asset for more appropriate and comprehensive peace agreements. Mediators must understand and integrate the cultural sensibilities of each context within peace processes and agreements, without allowing it to be used as a justification, for example to exclude women or marginalised groups.
• Women must be core constituents in both shaping security arrangements in peace negotiations, and in delivering them in peacebuilding processes thereafter. Peace agreements could require the establishment of conditions conducive for women’s recruitment into the police, military and judiciary as well as parliament. Peace processes could serve to build greater inclusion of women in political processes, and overcome male reticence.

Dr. Rama Mani, an established international expert on peacebuilding, justice and security, was invited by the Afghan Minister of Interior to make the opening presentation at the high-level Think-Tank on Police Reform during Insurgency convened by him in Kabul from 29 November to 1 December 2010. She is a Councilor of the World Future Council, and author of Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Blackwell, 2007). She is a Senior Research Associate of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Oxford, and Project Director of Ending Mass Atrocities: Southern Cultural Perspectives. She was formerly Executive Director of ICES – International Centre for Ethnic Studies in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and Director of the New Issues in Security Course at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

NOTES

[i] See www.ntm-a.com, and NTM-A: Year in Review, Nov 2010.

[ii] ‘NATO sees Long-Term Role after Afghan Combat”, Steven Erlanger and Jackie Calmes, New York Times, 20 November, 2010, (www.nytimes.com). (On 26^th November 2010, the day I landed in Kabul, US-led Coalition forces had been in Afghanistan as long as Russian forces, albeit with different purposes. See “US now in Afghanistan as long as Soviets”, Patrick Quinn, Associated Press, 26 November, 2010 (www.msnbc.msn.com).

[iii] From my opening framework presentation at the Think-Tank, 29.11.2010.

[iv] Minister’s opening speech at Think-Tank, 29.11.2010.

Women make up a mere 5.8 per cent in the current Parliament; 5 per cent in Provincial government and a lower 1.8 per cent in local government. This has had a direct impact on Sri Lanka’s peace process and transition to a post-conflict society.

One of the critical and insidious reasons for this is that mainstream political parties have consistently kept women’s nominations down to an appalling average of about 5 per cent.  Denying women equal opportunity to contest elections, coupled with patronage politics and a bartering of nominations among privileged men have restricted women’s access to representative politics. 

Being absent from key decision making in the legislature and local government had implications for the peace process. Women Parliamentarians were not present at any of the formal peace negotiations, which were conducted entirely by male politicians.  Instead, the Government chose to appoint five women from the non-government sector to a sub-committee on gender issues that was established to advice the plenary of the peace process in 2002/2003. A Tamil speaking Muslim woman parliamentarian was brought into the process only in 2005 in an attempt to kick start the stalled peace talks.   Women politicians’ engagement with formal peacemaking has therefore been minimal.  

Despite these challenges, some women have stepped forward to run in elections in the conflict affected north east at critical moments and when it has been unsafe to contest.  In the Municipal elections in 1997, held after a gap of over fifteen years, Sarojini Yogeswaran was elected as mayor in Jaffna. She was assassinated a few months later by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. At the next elections to the Jaffna Municipal Council in the aftermath of the war in 2009, 30 per cent of women contesting won, defying the national norm of 2 per cent. But, disappointingly, no political party came forward to nominate women to stand for parliamentary elections in 2010 from any of the conflict affected north or eastern districts despite women’s commendable electoral triumphs post-war at the municipal level. 

Sri Lankan women, from local activists to academics and politicians, have advocated for an increase in women’s representation for more than 15 years.  In the current post-war period the Government has proposed to introduce hybrid proportional representation and first past the post electoral system at the local level.  Despite being proposed as a means to enhance power distribution at the local level, this initiative is widely perceived as partisan and was challenged by eleven petitioners in the Supreme Court. The proposed amendments include a non-binding provision to increase nominations for women and youth to 25 per cent.  Two petitions by women’s groups argued that the provision was a violation of women’s right to equality guaranteed in the Constitution and submitted that the persistent failure of political parties ‘to give even a semblance of equality to women’ in the nominations process ‘casts a duty on the state to take affirmative action’. It further argued that women should not be grouped together with youth and that the provision to increase women’s representation should be mandatory and specific.

However, the court made a conservative judgment upholding the provisions of the Bill, refusing to accept that unequal nominations were a departure from equal treatment.

Sri Lanka needs to make the transition from a post-war to a post-conflict society. Conflicts inevitably produce structural transformations for some women, opening up new social, economic and political opportunities which challenge and reframe gender hierarchies and roles.  One way to consolidate such positive gains is to ensure women’s participation and representation in post war decision making processes. The experience of South Africa, Rwanda, Nepal and Liberia provide compelling evidence of how policy and legal reforms can contribute to women’s empowerment in post-war contexts.

By ignoring historical discrimination against women, both the executive and the judiciary in Sri Lanka have missed a vital opportunity to redress a patent wrong and allow the Sri Lankan polity to benefit from the invaluable experience of more than half its population.  This will make an already difficult transition to a post-war society even harder.  

Kumudini Samuel works in Sri Lanka as Director, Women and Media Collective.  She is also an Executive Committee member of Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN).  Kumudini was a member of the National Advisory Council on Peace and Reconciliation an advisory group of civil society and policy makers appointed by the President during the period of the peace process. Kumudini works on issues of women’s rights, human rights peace and conflict and has published on these concerns as well.